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Abstract I propose a formal model of the sensorimotor
loop and discuss corresponding extrinsic embodiment
constraints and the intrinsic degrees of freedom. These
degrees constitute the basis for adaptation in terms of
learning and should therefore be coupled with the
embodiment constraints. Notions of sufficiency and
embodied universal approximation allow us to formulate
principles for such a coupling. This provides a geometric
approach to the design of control architectures for
embodied agents.
Keywords Sensorimotor loop  Embodiment 
Information geometry  Cheap design  Universal
approximation
1 Introduction
Within the last few decades, it has become clear that an
understanding of intelligence and cognition has to take into
account the fact that behaving agents are embodied and
situated [9, 19]. At first sight this might appear like an
obvious and unimportant observation. After all, it is obvi-
ous that agents do have bodies and that they are situated in
some environment. So what? But the more we think about
it the more we should understand that this observation has
actually far-reaching implications. Any behaviour of an
agent is mediated through its sensorimotor apparatus and
its interactions with the environment. Therefore, the con-
trol of intelligent behaviour is inseparably intertwined with
the agent’s sensorimotor constraints. Such a coupling
should allow us to reveal design principles for brains and
their implemented control mechanisms. In this regard, it
has been pointed out that quite complex behavioural pat-
terns do not necessarily require complex control, leading to
the notions of morphological computation and the principle
of cheap design [19, 24, 25].
In this article, I want to formally address the tight
connection between the control architecture and the
embodiment of an agent in terms of geometry, in particular
information geometry [1, 3]. In order to do so, I apply a
theory of the sensorimotor loop in terms of a causal model,
as developed in [7, 13, 16], and propose an approach for
designing controller architectures that utilise the sensori-
motor constraints. My aim is not to provide the most
general results, but to exemplify the strength of the theory
by integrating initial results from an existing body of work
[2, 4, 8, 12, 14–16, 25], and discussing them, for the first
time, from a unifying perspective. The main intuition for
connecting control architectures to sensorimotor con-
straints is based on two assumptions. On one hand, the
architecture should be sufficient for the expression of
desired behaviours, given the embodiment constraints. This
clearly requires some amount of richness or complexity of
the architecture. On the other hand, it should be concise in
some natural sense. I discuss various versions of these two
assumptions and derive related results. In particular, I
address the notion of embodied universal approximation
and contrast it with the standard notion of universal
approximation. This is closely related to the recent work
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[16] which was initiated by the general line of research
sketched in the present article. Being based on stronger
assumptions, on the other hand, the results of [16] are more
refined than the corresponding ones presented in this broad
treatment.
Section 2 provides the conceptual and formal definition
of the sensorimotor loop of an embodied agent. To the
agent, the world appears as a black box which contains the
agent’s body and its environment. Sensorimotor mecha-
nisms and their generation of behaviour, which takes place
in the world, are formalised. Section 3 discusses and for-
malises extrinsic and intrinsic sensorimotor constraints.
Intrinsic constraints are given in terms of a controller
model, which allows the agent to adapt to the extrinsic
constraints. The notions of sufficiency and embodied uni-
versal approximation are introduced as basis for a geo-
metric design of controller models. Finally, Sect. 4
exemplifies the developed geometric methods in the con-
text of policy models and derives four examples of
embodied universal approximators.
2 A Formal Model of Embodied Agents
2.1 The Basic Components of the Sensorimotor
Loop
What is an embodied agent? In order to develop a theory of
embodied agents that allows us to cast the core principles
of the field of embodied intelligence into rigorous theo-
retical and quantitative statements, we need an appropriate
formal model. Such a model should be general enough to
be applicable to all kinds of embodied agents, including
natural as well as artificial ones, and specific enough to
capture the essential aspects of embodiment. How should
such a model look like? First of all, obviously, an
embodied agent has a body. This body is situated in an
environment with which the agent can interact, thereby
generating some behavior. In order to be useful, this
behavior has to be guided or controlled by the agent’s brain
or controller. We draw the boundary between the brain on
one side and the body, together with the environment, on
the other side. We assume that the brain receives sensor
signals from and sends effector or actuator signals to the
outside world (body and environment), which is the only
mechanism of signal transmission in both directions. Stated
differently, we assume that the brain is causally indepen-
dent of the world, given the sensor signals, and the world is
causally independent of the brain, given the actuator sig-
nals. We refer to this perspective as the black box per-
spective. In particular, the boundary between the body and
the environment is not directly ‘‘visible’’ for the brain and
has to be identified or actively constructed as result of the
interaction with the world.
2.2 The Mechanisms of the Sensorimotor Loop
Let us now develop a formal description of this sensori-
motor loop. We denote the set of world states by W. This
set can be, for instance, the position of a robot in a static
3D environment. Information from the world is transmitted
to the brain through sensors. Denoting the set of sensor
states by S, we model the mechanism of a sensor in terms
of an information transmission channel from W to S as it
is defined in information theory. More precisely, given a
world state w 2W, the response of the sensor can be
characterized by a probability distribution of possible
sensor states s 2S as result of w. For instance, if the
sensor is noisy, then its response will not be uniquely
determined. If the sensor is noiseless, that is deterministic,
then there will be only one sensor state as possible response
to the world state w. In any case, the response of the sensor
given the world state w can be described as a distribution
bðwÞ on the sensor states s. Therefore, the mechanism of
the sensor can be formalised as a Markov kernel
b : W ! DS;
where DS denotes the set of distributions on S. Each
distribution bðwÞ is uniquely determined by its values
bðw; dsÞ for infinitesimal sensor state sets ds. From this, we






Given a reference measure lS on the set of sensor states so
that all distributions bðwÞ are continuous with respect to lS,
we write bðw; sÞ for the corresponding density of bðwÞ, that
is bðw;S0Þ ¼ RS0 bðw; sÞ lSðdsÞ. In particular, this always
holds in the case of finitely many sensor states where we
take as reference measure the counting measure. Finally,
we denote the set of all sensor mechanisms by DWS .
After having described in detail the mathematical model
of a sensor, it is now straightforward to consider corre-
sponding formalisations of the other components of the
sensorimotor loop in terms of Markov kernels, where we
apply, without explicitly stating, the same notation con-
ventions as for the sensor. Based on our conceptual per-
spective, which is illustrated in Fig. 1b, we compose the
sensorimotor mechanisms according to a causal diagram,
which represents the interaction process of the agent with
the world (see Fig. 2).
We now continue with the notion of a policy. The agent
can generate an effect in the world in terms of its actuators.
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Since we consider the body as being part of the world, this
can lead, for instance, to some body movement of the
agent. In order to control or guide this movement, it is
beneficial for the agent to choose its actuator state based on
the internal controller state which contains information
about the world received through its sensors. Denoting the
controller state set by C and the actuator state set by A, we
can again consider a channel from C to A as formal model
of a policy, which we denote by p. Being more precise, a
policy receives a controller state c and generates, based on
c, a distribution pðcÞ of actuator states. Again, we have a
Markov kernel
p : C ! DA:
Note that this definition of a policy allows us to also
consider a random choice of actions, so-called non-deter-
ministic policies.
Finally, we formalise the dynamics a of the world and
the dynamics u of the controller, in terms of Markov
kernels
a : WA ! DW and u : CS ! DC:
2.3 From Mechanisms to Embodied Behaviours
In order to describe the interaction process between the
agent and the world, we have to sequentially apply the
individual mechanisms in the right order. We first consider
only one step as shown in Fig. 3, and then iterate this step.
Starting with an initial world state w and an initial con-
troller state c, we have the following Markov kernel that
describes the transition to the new world and controller
states:









uðc; s0; dc0Þbðw0; ds0Þ
Z
A
aðw; a0; dw0Þ pðc; da0Þ
¼ Pðc;w0; dc0ÞPðw; c; dw0Þ:
ð1Þ
Iterating this one-step transition T times defines a joint
process ðw1; c1Þ;    ; ðwT ; cTÞ of the world and the con-
troller, conditioned on the initial joint state ðw0; c0Þ.
Behaviour is a process that takes place in the world, for
instance as a particular movement of the agent’s body
which we considered to be part of the world (see Fig. 1).
This implies that only the world process w1; . . .;wT will be
of relevance for the study of behaviour. Marginalising out
the controller process c1; . . .; cT leads to
(a) (b)
Fig. 1 Two ways to define the agent separation: a agent (= brain ? body) interacts with its environment considered as a black box; b agent (=















Fig. 2 The causal diagram of the sensorimotor loop as conceptually








Fig. 3 The one step mechanism of going from w, c to w0; c0 as
defined by (1)
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Pðwt1; ct1; dwt; dctÞ;
ð2Þ
where we integrate T times. This Markov kernel encodes
all information that is required for the evaluation of
behaviour.
3 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Sensorimotor
Constraints
In the previous section, I have introduced the sensorimotor
loop in terms of the mechanisms p, a, b, and u. Here, the
mechanisms a and b are extrinsic to the agent and define its
embodiment constraints. I refer to these constraints as
being of the first kind in order to distinguish them from
other constraints introduced below. Clearly, a and b are not
fixed and can evolve in time. For instance, if an agent
moves from one environment to another the mechanism a
will change. Both mechanisms, a and b, will change, if the
agent’s body is subject to a developmental process or to a
partially disabling injury. However, we can expect that, due
to invariant structures and regularities of the environment
and the body, the mechanisms will remain in a restricted
domain. This fact implies a second kind of embodiment
constraint. In addition to the constraints of the first kind
encoded by a single pair r :¼ ða; bÞ of extrinsic mecha-
nisms, the evolution of r is restricted to trajectories within
a subset R of possible mechanisms, corresponding to the
variability of the body and the environment. We consider
the direct cause of this evolution within R to be completely
exogenous with respect to the agent and, therefore, it can
not be directly controlled by the agent. In contrast, we
assume that the intrinsic mechanisms p and u, summarised
as c ¼ ðp;uÞ, can be endogenously modified by the agent
in terms of a learning process. The question is whether this
intrinsic process is also constrained. Obviously, this will
depend on the degrees of freedom of the controller or brain
architecture. If it is rich enough to implement any p and u
then we have to consider the set
R C; where C :¼ DCA  DCSC ; ð3Þ
as domain for the process of all sensorimotor mechanisms.
But should we assume this richness of brain architectures?
I argue that it is not only not required but also beneficial for
the agent to have a restricted control architecture, which is
in line with the idea of cheap design within the field of
embodied intelligence. However, the theoretical study of
unrestricted control architectures, referred to as universal
approximators, is helpful for exploring the ones that are
optimal for the given constraints R of the agent. Here,
optimality involves two requirements. On one hand, the
control architecture should be sufficient in the sense that it
enables the agent to adapt to the embodiment constraints R.
On the other hand, it should be concise in order to effi-
ciently implement this adaptation. The field of embodied
intelligence offers many case studies as evidence for such
kinds of cheap control. This field highlights, in particular,
the fact that quite complex and useful behaviours do not
require much control [19].
Now, I am going to make these ideas on optimal
architectures more precise. A brain architecture can be
associated with a set M C, the set of those c ¼ ðp;uÞ
that can be generated by the architecture. We refer to such
a set as controller model or simply model. Most generally,
a model can be any subset M of C. Typically, a model M
is defined as the image of a map g, referred to as a
parametrisation of M, from a parameter set H  Rd to C.
Figure 4 illustrates the important parametrisation in terms
of synaptic couplings wij of neurons i and j. We call a
model M together with a parametrisation g a parametrised
model. Clearly, any map g : H! C is a parametrisation of
the model given by its image.
In order to be useful in applications, a parametrised
model is typically assumed to have further properties
which are context dependent, for instance smoothness
properties up to some order.
In addition to the embodiment constraints R, a model M
encodes the intrinsic constraints of the brain and represents,
at the same time, the domain in which learning processes
can take place. The set (3) of sensorimotor loops then
reduces to
SML :¼ RM: ð4Þ
In what follows, I want to identify intrinsic constraints, that
is a model M, that are coupled with the extrinsic con-
straints R according to some natural optimality conditions.
In order to do so, let us consider the map that assigns to
each sensorimotor loop its corresponding behaviour, the
behaviour map:
wr : C ! DWCW1 ; c ! Pðw0; c0; dw1; dw2; dw3; . . .Þ;
ð5Þ
where we use the formula (2) to define the Markov kernel
wrðcÞ by letting T go to 1. Now, say that we have given
for all r 2 R a set Or of optimal or desired behaviours,
such as behaviours with maximal predictive information
[25] or maximal expected reward [8]. In this article, opti-
mality of behaviours is not further specified and should not
be confused with the optimality of a model, which plays
the central role in this paper. Optimal models should, at
least, satisfy the following natural sufficiency condition.
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Definition 1 We say that a model M is (geometrically)
sufficient, if for all r 2 R and all corresponding behaviours
d 2 Or, there exists c 2 M that generates that behaviour,
that is wrðcÞ ¼ d.
Here, the bar over the set M denotes its topological
closure in C. In principle, this will depend on the under-
lying topology of C for which one has various natural
choices. I am not going to address these topological
questions in further detail. The main results of the next
section refer to the case where the state sets are finite and
therefore the topology is simply the standard one of a
finite-dimensional real vector space. If the closure of the
model M equals all theoretically possible intrinsic mech-
anisms, that is M¼ C, then we say that the model is a
universal approximator. This corresponds to the most
flexible brain architecture which I already mentioned above
[see Eq. (3)]. I argue that such a brain is not required for
embodied agents in order to be universal at the behavioural
level. There are sufficient models, in the sense of Defini-
tion 1, that are behaviourally equivalent to, but less com-
plex than, a universal approximator. Clearly one has to
specify the notion of complexity here. In any case, the
general study of sufficient models in relation to their
complexity provides one way to formally address the
subject of cheap design which plays a central role within
the field of embodied intelligence [19].
In order to be more precise, we consider as optimal
behaviour sets Or all behaviours that can in principle be
generated in the context of the extrinsic constraints given
by r. Stated differently, we set Or to be the image of wr
and obtain the following sufficiency property of a model
M, which we then call an embodied universal approxi-
mator (for R):
wrðMÞ ¼ wrðCÞ for all r 2 R: ð6Þ
In general, an embodied universal approximator does not
have to be concise. For instance, any universal approxi-
mator is in particular an embodied universal approximator.
In order to be consistent with the idea of cheap design, we
have to specify what we mean by ‘‘cheap’’ in terms of a
complexity measure and then compare various embodied
universal approximators with respect to their complexity.
This will be exemplified in the next section.
4 Cheap Embodied Universal Approximation
The intention of this section is to exemplify the developed
concepts and tools in terms of very specific theoretical
results on cheap design which are closely related to the
work [16]. In particular, I assume only finite sets W, S, C,
and A, and, furthermore, I concentrate on the definition of
policy models, ignoring other intrinsic constraints. To be
more precise, consider the set
C ¼ DCA  DCSC
of all possible intrinsic mechanisms p and u [see Eq. (3)].
In general, a model M defines a reduction of C in both
components, that is M C. In this section, however, we
study only reductions in the first component in terms of
policy models Mpolicy  DCA which correspond to joint
controller models
M¼Mpolicy  DCSC : ð7Þ
We say that a policy model is an embodied universal




















Fig. 4 Changes of the intrinsic
mechanisms p and u as result of
changes of parameters such as
synaptic coupling strengths
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has this property. Note that the restriction to policy models
excludes the possibility of coupling the two intrinsic mech-
anisms p andu. Such a coupling might provide a further way
of reducing the complexity of the controller model.
4.1 General Selection of Policy Models
Consider the one-step kernel Pðw; c; dw0Þ, which appears in





aðw; a;w0Þpðc; aÞ; c 2 C; w;w0 2W;
ð8Þ
where we indicate the dependence on p explicitly. We
leave all other mechanisms of the sensorimotor loop fixed
and consider two policies p1 and p2 that satisfy
P
p1ðw; c;w0Þ ¼ Pp2ðw; c;w0Þ for all c 2 C and all w;w0 2W:
ð9Þ
It follows directly from (1) that the corresponding beha-
viours, defined by (5), are identical. In other words, if for
all controller states c the distributions p1ðc; Þ and p2ðc; Þ
give the same expectation values of the functions
aw;w0 : a 7! aw;w0 ðaÞ :¼ aðw; a;w0Þ; w;w0 2W; ð10Þ
then p1 and p2 will generate the same behaviour, assuming
that all the other mechanisms are fixed. This redundancy
allows us to construct policy models with smaller dimen-
sionality without reducing the behavioural repertoire of the
agent. In order to do so, we identify two distributions l1
and l2 onA if they give the same expectation values of the
functions aw;w0 , w;w0 2W, and thereby obtain a partition
of DA into convex equivalence classes ½l, l 2 DA. Given
a policy p, we can now consider the family of classes
½pðc; Þ, c 2 C, and any further p0 satisfying p0ðc; Þ 2
½pðc; Þ will generate the same behaviour as p. Following
the idea of cheap design, it is natural to define a model by
choosing p0 to be the one with the least complexity.
Assuming that our complexity measure reflects the struc-
ture of a policy, and, furthermore, that structure corre-
sponds to low entropy, we have the natural choice provided
by the maximum entropy principle. More precisely, in each
class ½pðc; Þ we choose the distribution with the highest
entropy Pa2A pðc; aÞ ln pðc; aÞ. This policy is uniquely
determined, as the entropy is strictly concave and the
classes are convex. We obtain our first parametrisation
g : RCW
2 ! DCA,
h 7! phðc; aÞ :¼
exp
P





w;w0 hw;w0 ðcÞ aw;w0 ða0Þ
  :
ð11Þ
This is a quite prominent model in statistics and informa-
tion geometry, which is called exponential family [1].
Using general information-geometric arguments, it is
obvious that the parametrisation (11) defines an embodied
universal approximator for
Ra :¼ ða; bÞ : b 2 DWS
 
: ð12Þ
On the other hand, in most interesting cases the number
jCj jWj2 of parameters of this model will be a huge. It
turns out, however, that this ‘‘full’’ representation of poli-
cies is highly redundant. One obvious redundancy follows
from the fact that the aðw; a;w0Þ are probability distribu-
tions in w0, that is
P
w0 aw;w0 ðaÞ ¼ 1 for all w 2W and all
a 2A. As the space of constant functions on A cancels
out for each c 2 C, the number of parameters can be
reduced to jCj ðjWj2  1Þ. I argue that a further, concep-
tually deeper, reduction can be expected in embodied
systems. Formally, it is reflected by the fact that the sumX
w;w0
hw;w0 ðcÞ aw;w0 ðaÞ; ð13Þ
which appears in (11), can be strongly simplified due to
linear dependence of the vectors aw;w0 2 RA, w;w0 2W.
Let us consider two obvious reasons for this.
1. Assume that the world state w0 can not be reached from
the world state w in one step, that is
aðw; a;w0Þ ¼ 0 for all a 2A: ð14Þ
In this case, the corresponding term disappears from
the sum (13). In the situation of an embodied agent, the
majority of pairs ðw;w0Þ has this property, because the
physical constraints of the sensorimotor loop exclude
most of the transitions from w to w0 in one step.
2. It is not necessary that (14) holds in order to ignore a
term from the sum (13). It is already sufficient that
there is a constant r 2 R such that
aðw; a;w0Þ ¼ r for all a 2A: ð15Þ
Although formally this property is a simple extension
of (14), it highlights another important aspect. If
aðw; a;w0Þ ¼ r[ 0 for all a 2A then w0 can be
reached from w in one step but in a way that does not
involve the actuators. The transition from w to w0 is not
sensitive to the actuators, and therefore its representa-
tion does not play any role in our parametrisation (11).
Clearly, we can adjust the parametrisation (11) to the
dimension da of the vector space
Va :¼ span aw;w0 : w;w0 2W
   RA;
which is at most jAj. Furthermore, note that the constant
functions are contained in Va. Therefore, there are da  1
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functions ak 2 Va, which we refer to as feature vectors,
such that every policy of the structure (11) can be
expressed in terms of a linear combination of the ak and a
constant function. This leads to the following simplification
of the parametrisation (11).
Proposition 1 The parametrisation g : RC  Rda1 !
DCA;









  ; ð16Þ
defines an embodied universal approximator for Ra:
In this parametrisation of the policies, we have at most
jCj ðda  1Þ parameters which can be much smaller than the
number of parameters in the parametrisation (11). However,
clearly they define the same policy model, which is a maximum
entropy model. This was motivated by the idea that the maxi-
mum entropy distributions correspond to the least complex or
structured ones. However, high entropy distributions tend to
have a large support. We can take a different standpoint and ask
the following question: If an agent can generate a behaviour
with only a few actuator states, why should it involve more
actuator states than that? In other words, if we consider actuator
states to be costly then we should design the model in a way that
the policies have only a minimal required number of actuator
states. Interpreting, for simplicity of the argument, entropy as a
cardinality measure, then we would rather prefer distributions
with minimal entropy. From this perspective, the minimum
entropy distributions appear more natural. Note, that, in contrast
to the uniqueness of the maximum entropy distribution in a
class ½l where l 2 DA; there are many distributions that
locally minimise the entropy in that class. On the other hand, it
turns out that the cardinality of the support of all these distri-
butions is upper bounded by da (see corresponding derivations
in [2]). More precisely, the following holds: If for a policy p; all
distributions pðc; Þ are local minimisers of the entropy in the
respective classes ½pðc; Þ; then
j a 2A : pðc; aÞ[ 0f gj  da for all c 2 C: ð17Þ
Clearly, a policy model Mpolicy is an embodied universal
approximator, if it contains all policies that satisfy (17) in its
closure. We now explicitly define such a policy model with
dimMpolicy  2 jCj da:
Proposition 2 For any injective function f : A! R; for
which f ðaÞ ¼ f ða0Þ only if a ¼ a0; the parametrisation
g : RC  R2 da ! DCA;
h 7! phðc; aÞ :¼
exp
P2 da





k¼1 hkðcÞ f kða0Þ
  ; ð18Þ
defines an embodied universal approximator for Ra (here,
f kðaÞ denotes the kth power of f(a)).
The proof of this statement is based on [2, 14] and is given
in the Appendix. The policy model defined by (18) has
2 jCj da parameters, which is larger than the number
jCj ðda  1Þ of parameters of the previous model defined in
Proposition 1. However, there are important differences.
The feature vectors f k; k ¼ 1; . . .; 2 da; do not explicitly
depend on a; but their number depends on the dimension of
Va: Therefore, they can be used for all mechanisms a0 that
have at most the same dimension da0 as a: Furthermore, these
feature vectors do not require much information to be
specified. More precisely, the property of f that is required in
Proposition 2 is a generic property of real functions onA so
that f can be chosen randomly. Furthermore, given such a
function f as the first feature vector, all the other feature
vectors are determined as the k-th powers of f. With the set
Rda :¼ ða0; bÞ : da0  da; b 2 DWS
  ð19Þ
of extrinsic constrains, which is larger than Ra as defined
by (12), we have the following direct implication of
Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 The policy model of Proposition 2 is an
embodied universal approximator for Rda :
4.2 From Models to Architectures
In the last section, we defined policy models for general
unstructured sets C and A; and the policies were abstract
objects without any reference to a mechanism that gener-
ates or computes an output a 2A given the input c 2 C. In
this section, we extend our previous ideas to the setting of
systems consisting of interacting nodes such as neuronal
systems. However, we restrict attention to the actuators and
assume, for simplicity, that we have n 1 binary actuators
with states 1 and þ1; that is A ¼ f1;þ1gn: For each
non-empty subset N  ½n :¼ f1; . . .; ng; the interaction
among the actuators in N is described in terms of the
monomial




where hNðcÞ is the interaction coefficient or strength of the
actuators in N, which we assume to be dependent on the
controller state c 2 C. We refer to the cardinality of N as
the order of the interaction. For jNj ¼ 2; we have the
important special case of a pairwise interaction, which is of
particular interest within the field of neural networks.
There, the interaction coefficients are usually interpreted as
the synaptic connection strengths between the neurons. If
we want to incorporate interactions among nodes of all
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subsets N  ½n; then we have to consider the following






Note that, for each c 2 C we have 2n  1 parameters hNðcÞ;
so that the overall number of parameters is jCj jAj  1ð Þ;
which coincides with the dimension of the polytope DCA:
Clearly, any function A ¼ f1;þ1gn ! R can be written
in the form (21). By setting in (21) all hNðcÞ to zero, if
jNj[ k; we reduce this space of functions to the space of
functions that involve only interaction of at most order k.
This defines the following policy model, which we refer to
as k-interaction model:



















  : ð22Þ
Given this increasing family of models, ordered according to
k, we now address the problem of finding the sufficient order
of interaction so that the corresponding k-interaction model
is an embodied universal approximator for Rda : For a first
simple estimate, we consider again the policy model of
Proposition 2. Given that we now assume A ¼ f1;þ1gn;
it is possible to define the function f as a linear function, that
is f ðaÞ ¼ f ða1; . . .; anÞ ¼
Pn
i¼1 wi ai so that f ðaÞ 6¼ f ða0Þ
whenever a 6¼ a0: Note that this follows from the finiteness of
A: As a linear function defined on Rn; f is never injective,
except for n ¼ 1: For the kth powers of f we obtain



























with corresponding coefficients hNðcÞ: This proves that the
policy model of Proposition 2 is contained in the ð2 daÞ-
interaction model, and that therefore the latter is also an
embodied universal approximator. However, it turns out
that this can be considerably improved. It directly follows
from a result by Kahle [12] that 2 da can be replaced by a
much smaller interaction order, which defines the follow-
ing policy model.
Proposition 3 With
kðaÞ :¼ dlog2 da þ 1ð Þe;
the kðaÞ-interaction model is an embodied universal
approximator for Rda (dxe denotes the smallest integer  x).
In neural networks theory, the interaction order is gen-
erally considered to be pairwise. This is valid for the policy
model of Proposition 3 only in the trivial case da ¼ 1: If
we aim at a neuronal interpretation of policy models then
we have to represent higher order interactions in terms of
pairwise interactions, which is always possible by extend-
ing the system appropriately. One important special case in
line with this general idea is given by the so-called re-
stricted Boltzmann machine (RBM). In order to define it,
we extend the above system of n nodes by further m so-
called hidden nodes with the same state space f1;þ1g:
The overall state is then given as a pair ðh; aÞ ¼
ðh1; . . .; hm; a1; . . .; anÞ 2 f1;þ1gmþn: We now consider
the following family of kernels, which involves at most
pairwise interactions between the hidden nodes and the
actuators:
Finally, we marginalise out the hidden nodes and obtain the
following policy model, which is, for each c 2 C; a
restricted Boltzmann machine:
h 7! phðc; aÞ ¼
X
h
phðc; h; aÞ: ð24Þ
Therefore, we call this policy model controlled restricted
Boltzmann machine (see Fig. 5). Due to general results by
Le Roux and Bengio [22] and Montu´far and Ay [15], it is
known that any distribution of support cardinality smaller
than or equal to da can be represented by an RBM with





hi;jðcÞ hi aj þ
P
1 im hiðcÞ hi þ
P







hi;jðcÞ h0i a0j þ
P
1 im hiðcÞ h0i þ
P
1 j n hjðcÞ a0j
  : ð23Þ
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da  1 hidden nodes. Together with (17), this directly
implies the following result.
Proposition 4 A controlled restricted Boltzmann
machine, defined by (23) and (24), with m ¼ da  1 hidden
nodes is an embodied universal approximator for Rda :
The dependence of the parameters hi;jðcÞ; hiðcÞ; and
hjðcÞ on the controller state c can be quite complicated.
Assuming that the controller also has a composite structure
with k binary nodes, it is possible to represent this depen-
dence in terms of pairwise interactions between the con-
troller nodes and the hidden nodes. This leads to the
definition of a conditional restricted Boltzmann machine
[17]. Cheap control with such machines has been theoret-
ically and experimentally studied in [16]. This study is
based on the notion of embodiment dimension, which is a
refinement of the dimension da used in the present article.
5 Conclusions
In order to approach a general theory of embodied
agents, I have introduced a formal model of the senso-
rimotor loop, which specifies its intrinsic and extrinsic
mechanisms, building on previous work [7, 13]. The
extrinsic mechanisms represent the embodiment con-
straints of the system which can be utilised by appro-
priate adjustment of the intrinsic mechanisms in order to
express useful behaviours. This requires some degree of
flexibility of the control architecture, which I formalised
in terms of a sufficiency notion. As a particular case, I
studied in more detail embodied universal approximation
and the corresponding design of controller models in
terms of geometry. However, I argued that sufficiency
should not be the only requirement involved in systems
design. In order to address the notion of cheap design
within the field of embodied intelligence, we have to
identify sufficient controller architectures with low
complexity. Clearly, one would assume that selection
pressure has generated such architectures of naturally
evolved brains, which can cope with limitations of mass
and energy resources. For instance, the field of sparse
coding has provided evidence for internal representations
of external stimuli in terms of sparse neuronal activity
[18]. However, there are many aspects that contribute to
the overall complexity of a controller model, and we are
far from a conclusive definition of complexity that would
account for the right notion of cheap control. Therefore,
I was not very precise in this regard and used a few
complexity notions as motivation for the policy models
that I have defined. In this context, low complexity of a
policy meant: 1. high entropy of the policy, 2. low
number of actuator states used by the policy, 3. low
interaction order among the actuators, and 4. low number
of hidden nodes in a restricted Boltzmann machine.
There is a further important aspect of complexity, which
I did not address explicitly. If we design policy models, we
have to distinguish between the complexity of the model
itself and the complexity of a particular policy, taken from
that model. One can design models for which the indi-
vidual policies have low complexity, but the overall model
is hard to describe. However, it is problematic to imple-
ment such a structure. In nature, its information has to be
transmitted through genetic inheritance. This information
transmission clearly has a limited capacity, which is, for
instance, modulated by the mutation rate. Therefore,
robustness issues have also to be taken into account [5, 20].
To conclude, the right choice of a model should balance the
complexities of both, the model itself and the policies that
are implemented by the model. This is a quite natural idea
within complexity theory [6, 10, 11, 21, 23].
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Fig. 5 The architecture of a controlled restricted Boltzmann machine. It consists of a restricted Boltzmann machine with the set V ¼ f1; . . .; ng
of visible nodes and the set H ¼ f1; . . .;mg of hidden nodes. The interaction is pairwise, where each node in V interacts with each node in H. No
lateral interactions within V and within H are assumed. The interaction coefficients hi;j; hi; and hj; where i 2 H and j 2 V ; are all functions of the
controller state c
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 We consider a policy p with the
property that the supports Ac of its distributions pðc; Þ;
c 2 C; on A have at most da elements. For each c 2 C; we
define the function gc : A! R;
a 7! gcðaÞ :¼
Y
a02Ac
ðf ðaÞ  f ða0ÞÞ2 ¼
X2 da
k¼0
hð0Þk ðcÞ f kðaÞ:
Obviously, gc 0; and gcðaÞ ¼ 0 if and only if a 2Ac:
Furthermore, we consider the polynomial hc : R! R;
t 7!Pda1k¼0 hð1Þk ðcÞ tk; that satisfies
Xda1
k¼0
hð1Þk ðcÞ f kðaÞ ¼ hcðf ðaÞÞ ¼ lnpðc; aÞ; a 2Ac:
Obviously, the one parameter family




of policies is contained in the model defined by (18). Note
that we can ignore the term for k ¼ 0 because this gives a













This proves that p is in the closure of the model defined by
(18). h
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